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7Lessons of Northern Ireland 
and the Relevance of the 
Regional Context
Adrian Guelke
It should be stated at the outset that the notion of Northern Ireland’s political settlement as a model for other societies evokes as much hostility as it does enthusiasm. Indeed, at 
least as much has been written in criticism of the idea of Northern Ireland as a model as in its 
support. Understanding the perspective of the critics on this issue is a useful starting point 
for reviewing the lessons to be learnt from the application to Northern Ireland of a variety of 
counter terrorism and conflict resolution policies, since it provides a means of sorting out in 
which respects Northern Ireland’s experience might be relevant to other cases and in which 
it is not. 
Couching the issue as one of lessons is helpful to begin with, since unlike the notion of a model, it 
permits the drawing of negative as well as positive lessons from the Northern Ireland case. However, 
this does not override some of the commonest objections that are made to using the Northern Ireland 
case to draw conclusions about how ethnic conflicts might be settled. Until quite recently, the argument 
could be advanced that it was premature to derive lessons from Northern Ireland simply because the 
story of the peace process was by no means complete. As recently as the beginning of 2010 it seemed 
entirely conceivable that the whole settlement, based on the 1998 Belfast Agreement and the subsequent 
2006 St Andrews Agreement, might unravel. Intensive negotiations among the parties resulted in the 
Hillsborough Castle Agreement, which provided a formula for the devolution of justice and policing 
powers. This step was widely described as being the last piece of the jigsaw of the peace process.
Confidence in the durability of the new dispensation received two further boosts from events in 2011. 
The first of these events was the completion of a full term by the Northern Ireland Assembly without the 
necessity of suspension for the first time since it was established in 1998. That success was underpinned 
by the outcome of the elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly in May, which was widely interpreted 
as an endorsement of power-sharing among the parties, and of constructive cooperation between the 
First Minister and Deputy First Minister in particular. The results were a resounding endorsement of 
these leaders and their parties (see Table 1). The second event was the Queen’s highly successful visit 
to the Republic of Ireland in May 2011. This underscored a dimension of the Northern Ireland peace 
process that has tended to be underplayed: the institutionalisation of cooperation between the UK and 
the Republic of Ireland going back to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of November 1985. Indeed, one way 
the Northern Ireland peace process can be interpreted is as a case of successful conflict management 
by the British and Irish governments.
But if these developments made it more difficult to question the staying power of the settlement, it was 
still possible for critics to raise questions about the quality of the peace that had been achieved. They 
tended to focus on three areas: political polarisation, the persistence of segregation and continuing 
political violence. Since the start of the peace process with the paramilitary ceasefires of 1994, voters 
8have deserted the more moderate of the political parties on either side of the province’s sectarian divide for 
their radical counterparts. This trend is illustrated in Table 1, which sets out the results in terms of seats of the 
four elections that have taken place to the Northern Ireland Assembly. Thus, the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) overtook the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in the 2003 elections, while Sinn Féin also displaced the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) as the dominant party of Irish nationalism in Northern Ireland in the same 
elections. The DUP and Sinn Féin consolidated their position in the elections of 2007 and 2011. However, 
the nature of the election campaigns run by the two parties in 2011 was markedly different from previous 
campaigns, with both parties championing their role in making the settlement work. The triumph of the radical 
parties might be seen as a vindication of the thesis that an alliance of the extremes offered the best prospect 
of stable government because the radical parties were less vulnerable to outbidding than the UUP and the 
SDLP. However, it would be absurd to suggest that this outcome was arrived at by the design of the British and 
Irish governments. It was only after the dominance of the radical parties had been established that the two 
governments started to find virtue in the necessity of having to shape the settlement in the interests of the radicals. 
Table 1: Results of elections to Northern Ireland Assembly under the Belfast Agreement, indicating 
seats won by main parties and showing polarisation of opinion 
Party/Year 1998 2003 2007 2011
Democratic Unionist Party 20 30 36 38
Sinn Féin 18 24 26 29
Ulster Unionist Party 28 27 18 16
Social Democratic and Labour Party 24 18 16 14
Alliance Party  6  6  7  8
Others 12  3  3  3
TOTAL 108 108 108 108
Source: Information taken from Nicholas Whyte, ‘Elections Northern Ireland’ on http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/ 
heading of ‘deaths due to the Northern Ireland security 
situation’, the first year of which was 1969. The police 
published annual assessments of the number of such 
deaths, not merely after the paramilitary ceasefires of 
1994, but even after the Belfast Agreement received 
its popular mandate in both jurisdictions in Ireland in 
referendums in May 1998. The figures for 1998 to 
2010 are given in Table 2. By far the most lethal of 
these post-Troubles years was 1998 itself, largely as a 
result of the Omagh bomb, perpetrated by dissident 
Republicans. While the overwhelming majority of 
those killed throughout the period since the Belfast 
Agreement were civilians, it should be noted that 
this category includes members of paramilitary 
organisations. Indeed, one factor contributing to 
the killings since 1998 has been internal feuds within 
and between paramilitary groups. It remains the case, 
however, that members of the security forces are prime 
British Prime Minister David Cameron raised the issue 
of the persistence of segregation in his speech to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly in June 2011. He expressed 
his dismay that the number of peace walls dividing 
Protestant and Catholic communities had increased 
since the 2006 St Andrews Agreement from 38 to 
48, and cited a survey that estimated the cost of the 
duplication of services in Northern Ireland as a result 
of segregation at £1.5 billion a year. Echoing criticism 
that has been made by groups in Northern Ireland 
that have championed integration such as Platform for 
Change, Cameron asserted: ‘Northern Ireland needs 
a genuinely shared future, not a shared out future’.
The third issue latched on to by critics of the 
functioning of Northern Ireland’s devolved government 
was the continuation of political violence. Significantly, 
the police continued to collect statistics under the 
9targets for dissident Republicans. This was reflected 
in the murder of two soldiers and a police officer 
in March 2009, as well as the murder of another 
police officer, Ronan Kerr, in April 2011. Kerr’s death 
followed a series of unsuccessful attempts by dissident 
Republican groups to kill police officers. That mirrors 
the pattern present in the latter stage of the Troubles 
before 1994, which was that through the course of 
the conflict, the security forces became increasingly 
successful in protecting themselves against the groups 
that sought to kill their members.
In the case of the Loyalist paramilitaries, two killings 
gave rise to widespread concern in 2009 and 2010. The 
first of these was the killing of a Catholic community 
worker Kevin McDaid in Coleraine in May 2009 by a 
sectarian mob linked to a Loyalist paramilitary group. 
It raised fears that further sectarian killings might 
undermine the peace. The second was the result of 
an internal feud in the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). 
Bobby Moffett was shot dead in broad daylight in 
the Shankill Road area of Belfast. The sanctioning 
of the killing by the UVF, after the organisation had 
completed the decommissioning of its weapons, 
showed the lengths paramilitary groups were willing 
to go to defend their turf and pointed to how far 
Northern Ireland still had to go to be free of such 
groups. However, lethal violence is only one aspect of 
post-Belfast Agreement political violence. The period 
since 1998 has seen a high level of low-level violence, 
particularly where Protestant and Catholic working 
class districts intersect. At one of these interfaces there 
was sustained rioting over two nights in June 2011. 
Further rioting in the summer months in Northern 
Ireland is linked to continuing disagreement over the 
routes of a small number of Orange Order parades.
 
Table 2: Deaths Due to the Northern Ireland Security Situation
Year Police Reserve Army UDR/RIR Civilians Total
1998  1  0  1  0  53  55
1999  0  0  0  0  7  7
2000  0  0  0  0  18  18
2001  0  0  0  0  17  17
2002  0  0  0  0  13  13
2003  0  0  0  0  11  11
2004  0  0  0  0  5  5
2005  0  0  0  0  5  5
2006  0  0  0  0  3  3
2007  0  0  0  0  3  3
2008  0  0  0  0  1  1
2009  1  0  2  0  2  5
2010  0  0  0  0  2  2
TOTALS  2  0  3  0  140  145
Police Royal Ulster Constabulary
Reserve Royal Ulster Constabulary Reserve
UDR Ulster Defence Regiment
RIR Royal Irish Regiment
CIVILIANS including members of illegal paramilitary organisations
Source: http://www.psni.police.uk 
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the deal. Just as Northern Ireland’s consociational 
institutions providing for power-sharing among the 
province’s main political parties was the product of 
external conflict management rather than of internal 
elite political accommodation, as in Lijphart’s original 
example of consociationalism in the Netherlands, so 
too in Cyprus it was the external parties who took 
the lead in designing the country’s institutions at its 
independence in 1960. That experiment failed, as 
did the Sunningdale Agreement in Northern Ireland 
in 1973-4. However, these failures have not deterred 
external powers from using consociationalism as a tool 
of conflict management and resolution in other cases, 
including that of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The similarities 
have not gone unnoticed. In particular, a number of 
scholars with widely different views on their outcomes 
have compared the cases of the Belfast Agreement 
and the Dayton Accords.
However, the case that has generated the most 
controversy both among politicians and scholars has 
been that of Israel/Palestine. Peter Hain put forward 
the view that the appropriate lesson for Israel from the 
Northern Ireland peace process is that Israel should be 
ready to enter into negotiations with Hamas. David 
Trimble has argued that this misrepresents what 
happened in Northern Ireland. Trimble emphasises 
the parameters within which negotiations on Northern 
Ireland’s future took place, including the observance 
of a ceasefire and the two governments’ insistence 
that the principle of consent would form part of the 
settlement. In other words, it would be provided 
that a united Ireland could only come about with the 
consent of majorities in both jurisdictions in Ireland, 
underpinning what nationalists had once opposed 
as amounting to a Unionist veto. Trimble’s approach 
might seem to beg the question as to what are the 
roughly equivalent parameters in the case of the 
Middle East conflict. The obvious factors would seem 
to be ending violence and an acceptance of the borders 
that prevailed before the Six Day War in 1967, subject 
only to the negotiation of a few, mutually agreed 
adjustments. The fact that the current Prime Minister 
of Israel has emphatically rejected the second of these 
parameters is one indication, among many, as to 
why the prospects for an externally promoted peace 
settlement along the lines of what was achieved in 
Northern Ireland remain so poor. Even so, the parties 
But even if the imperfections of Northern Ireland’s 
settlement are set to one side, the relevance of the 
Northern Ireland case to other parts of the world can 
be questioned on a number of grounds. In the first 
place, unlike many other deeply divided societies with 
which comparisons are made with Northern Ireland, 
the province is not a state. Indeed, it is a small region 
within what is otherwise a longstanding and stable 
liberal-democracy. Further, Northern Ireland is part 
of the rich industrialised world. As a region of the 
UK, Northern Ireland, like the Republic of Ireland, 
has been part of the European Community/Union 
since 1973. However, these particular features of the 
Northern Ireland situation can also be used as a way 
of identifying certain cases to which Northern Ireland’s 
experience is most likely to be relevant.
For example, Northern Ireland can be compared with 
other divided regions within states. An interesting 
case in point is Kashmir. As in the case of Northern 
Ireland, it can be argued that progress towards a 
resolution of this conflict is dependent on the evolving 
relationship between India and Pakistan and their 
governments’ taking on the role of conflict managers. 
While the South Asian Free Trade Area is by no means 
equivalent to the European Union, it does provide a 
useful framework for the promotion of cooperation 
between India and Pakistan that is not dependent on 
progress on the issue of Kashmir. An aspect of the 
Belfast Agreement of particular interest in Kashmir 
was its provision for cross-border cooperation on a 
range of issues. The initiation of a bus service between 
the Pakistan-controlled and Indian-ruled Kashmir in 
2005 was seen in the sub-continent as a confidence-
building measure, as well as a first step towards the 
development of such cooperation in the context of 
this long-running dispute. A case within Europe with 
some similarities to Northern Ireland is Cyprus. While 
partitioned Cyprus is not part of any other state, the 
role of external parties, particularly the relationship 
between Greece and Turkey, has been a significant 
element in efforts to settle this bloodless conflict. The 
best opportunity for a settlement arose in the context of 
Cyprus’s membership of the European Union in 2004. 
Ironically, the complicated Annan Plan (so-called after 
the UN Secretary-General) for the island’s reunification 
was rejected in a referendum that year by a majority 
of Greek Cypriots, while Turkish Cypriots accepted 
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in the Middle East, as well as external mediators in 
the conflict, are likely to continue to pay attention 
to aspects of Northern Ireland’s experience that 
may fit with developments in the Israel/Palestinian 
conflict, both because of the features they have in 
common and the resonance that exists between 
them. Admittedly, this is limited by the fact that the 
inhabitants of Northern Ireland remain far more alive 
to the comparison than anyone in the Middle East.
The length of time it took for Northern Ireland’s political 
settlement to crystallise, as well as the relatively benign 
regional context of the conflict, provide ample basis for 
scepticism about how far the province’s experience of 
conflict resolution can be successfully exported to other 
regions of the world. Situated on Western Europe’s 
inner periphery, the island of Ireland lay beyond the 
areas of competition among the major powers, even 
during the Cold War. The Irish Question was exploited 
from time to time by the Soviet Union for propaganda 
purposes, but there was never any prospect that the 
Soviet Union would gain a foothold on the island. The 
rhetoric of one British minister, that if the Republican 
challenge was not met that Ireland might become 
another Cuba, had little credibility and attracted little 
interest. The lack of strategic significance of Ireland 
was even more evident after the end of the Cold 
War. By contrast, a number of the divided societies 
with which Northern Ireland is compared lie in areas 
which for oil or other reasons have continued to be 
regarded as strategically important to major powers.
It is worth underlining that an argument which had 
considerable traction during the late 1980s was that 
there was very little prospect of a settlement in the Irish 
case, not because of the impossibility of compromise, 
but because there were too few incentives for the 
parties to end the conflict. Too little was at stake for 
the parties to arrive at any settlement, it was asserted. 
In the event, that view proved mistaken. The commonly 
expressed assumption now that parties elsewhere will 
prove unable to derive usable and valuable lessons 
from the outcome in Northern Ireland is also unlikely 
to hold. But both the forms and consequences of 
the application of these lessons are likely to vary 
widely.   
